Theodore Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheet Company, State Insurance Fund And Second Injury Fund : Petitioner\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1984
Theodore Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheet
Company, State Insurance Fund And Second
Injury Fund : Petitioner's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Roger D. Sandack; Attorney for Petitioner
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheet Co., No. 19248 (1984).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4164
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THEODORE HODGES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. Case No. 19248 
WESTERN PILING & SHEET COMPANY,) 
STATE INSURANCE FUND and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Respondents. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
Writ of Review from 
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah 
JAMES A. BLACK 
Suite 500 
Ten West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Attorney for State 
Insurance Fund 
FRANK V. NELSON 
84101 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorney for Industrial 
Commission of Utah 
GILBERT MARTINEZ 
160 East 300 South 
P. O. Box 5800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Second Injury Fund 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
Roger D. Sandack 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Clsrk. Supreme Court, Utah 
THEOL02E HOOJES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. Case No. 19248 
WESTERN PILING & SHEET COMP~NY,) 
STATE HISURANCE FUND and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Respondents. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
Writ of Review from 
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah 
JAMES A. BLACK 
Suite 500 
Ten West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, lJT 
Attorney for State 
Insurance Fund 
FRANK V. NELSON 
84101 
AssistaGt Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorney for Industrial 
CoITL<1issicn of Utah 
GILBERT ~ARTIN~3 
160 Esst 100 So~th 
P. 0. i3JX 5800 
Salt Lake City, UT 8~111 
Attorney for Second Injury Fund 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
Roger D. Sandack 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Petitioner 
N1\TU<1.E OF CASE 
DISPOSITION lN LOWER ADMINISTRATIVE BODY 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGU"lENT 
I. HODGES' BENEFITS MUST BE BASED ON 
THE AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE FOR'IULA 
PROVIDED BY LAW •.•..••.• 
II. HODGES IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
PERt'Ll\NENT TOTAL DISABILITY BE"lEFITS 
BASED UPON THE FINDING OF 35% IMPAIR-
MENT, EXCLUSIVE OF HIS ARTHRITIC 
CONDITION .•.••••.••••• 
I I I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ACTED 
ARBITRARILY BY FAILING TO CONSIDER 














Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2rl 790 
(Utah 1981) . . . • . . . . . . . . . ...•. 10, 11 
Buxton v. Industrial Commission, 587 P.2d 121 
(Utah 1978) . . . . . . . . • . . . . ... 11 
Millard County v. Industrial Commission, 
62 Utah 46, 217 P. 974 (1923)..... • •.•. 8 
Morrison-Merrill & Co. v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 81 Utah 363, 18 P.2d 295 (1933). . ••. 8 
Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981) . • . . . 10 
Park Utah Consol. Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
84 Utah 481, 36 P.2d 179 (1934) • . • . • . . 8, 9 
Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. McMahon, 
5 0 9 S. W. 2 d 6 6 5 (Tex. Ci v. App. 19 7 4) . . 3' 9 
United Park Mines Comoany v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 
410, 393 P. 2d 800 (1964) •...•..••....... 10 
Statutes and Regulations 
42 u.s.c. §403 (f) (3) ... 6 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-75 (1). 7' 9, 14 




WESTER:-l PI LitiG & SrlEET C~, ·1P.'\NY,) 
STATE INS'JRANCE Fu:rn a:id 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Responder. ts. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 19248 
This is a review of a final ord2r ~f the Industrial 
Commission of Utah which awarded Petitioner partial benefits 
under Utah's worker compensation laws, but denied Petitioner 
perDanent and total bene~its. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER ADMINISTRTIVE BODY 
The Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the 
Administrative Law Judge's Supp~2mental Order, which reversed 
and denied a previously entered award of permanent totai 
disability benefits. ~'\F 301polc"'ental Order also reduced 
Pet1t1cn~r ca~lj 0r 0 arn $5,500.00 per year without curtailing 
his Social Security bene~its, thus resulting in a weekly 
b~neEJ_t ~asei Llpon ann~alized earnings of $5,500.00 rather than 
RELl!·~F S<J~_1,;.1-.;:' J': , 
-------------
Pe: i t i :) 1 ~ r re q 'J e.::: t ":::; ':. '-1 l ~ r-i 1 r. ': a - ' 0 ..... 
reverse and rF:.nand t'.le '.Jrj._:r .)f t'ri·--:: In(~·1:-otr 13.l ..... 1 J"1"1-~_;l-:>:1 f > 
the purpose of awarding permanc~t total iisability b~n~fits at 
the appropria~e, hi3her ~eeklj compensation rate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner, Theodor" Hodges ("Hodges"), a 68-year-old 
welder, was injured on February 23, 1981, during the course of 
his employment with Western Piling & Sheet Company ("Western 
Piling"). Hodges was loading a length of heavy 12-inc~ wall 
pipe when the pipe suddenly fell, striking him in the right 
shoulder. (R.23-26.) 
Prior to this accident, Hodges had been in the employ 
of Western Piling for about a decade. (R.23.) As reflected in 
the testimony of a co-employee at Western Piling, Hodges W3S a 
man of pronounced vigor and energy: 
Q. I'd like you to tell us, before ~hat accide~c, 
your opinion of Mr. Hodge's physical condition 
to do the work he was doing. 
A. I felt he was capable and a real good man to 
work with really. 
Q. Physically, though, was he active? 
A. Physically, he was really active. He could 
keep up with the •est of us young guys, and 
I thought he was a super wor~er. 
Q. Did he move quic~ly and s~iftly? 
A. Swiftly and accurately. (R. 61.) 




j~S t~3~ his Sa~i3l Security 
~ow, si~ce 10~ ha?e been on 
you have continued to work? 
Social Security, 
Is that correct? 
A. Well, you're encitled to wor~--well, like 
this year, I can ~ake $5,500 and stay on 
Social Security. 
Q. So you wo:k jJst enough to--
A. I try to keep working to keep in shape. 
Becduse if you lay around, you're not going 
tc be worth a shit. So I try to ~eep working. 
I could use the money. That's about what it 
amounted to. (R.42.) 
Accordingly, at the time of his accident on February 23, 1981, 
Hodges was working a full 40 hours per week l?.241 with no 
present intention to quit or reduce his wor~load. 
On the day following his accident, Hodges consulted 
his chiropractor, who referred him to Dr. Gordon R. Kimball. 
(R.30-31.) Dr. Kimball began treatment with Cortisone 
injections. Within three days of receiving a full injection of 
Cortisone to the left shoulder on April 6, 1981, Hodges 
expe:ienced severe body swelling and pain in his joints. His 
weig~t suddenlJ ballooned from l~S pounds to 195 pounds. 
(R.30-12.) ~~is dr3m3~ic flac~-u~ of ~is previously 
3SY~?t~~3~i= ac~~rit1c c0njition remained so serious that on 
JJne 19, 1981, Dr. Kimball admitted Hodges to the hospital and 
obtained additional consultation from Dr. Paul ~iner. (R.32-33, 
7 6.) ?ou: days late:, while incapacitated and under medication 
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in the hospital, ~r. Hodges was inter;1i~d~J 
Di tu r i , a ri e d ~ s a 1 cons u l tan t h i r e d b 'J t ~1 '~' ~ ':. .J t ~ :: ~ ~ J ~ j ... , , 
to evaluate the Fund's liability. (R.43-~4.) :\;; a rr:sult ot 
this interview, the State Insurance Fund denied liability or 
medical treatment received by Hodges after June 23, 1981. 
(R.9.) Hodges was then released from the hospical because he 
could no longer afford the cost. (R.52.) 
Application was made to the Industrial Commission of 
Utah for hearing on Hodges' claims. At the conclusion of the 
hearing on March 11, 1982, Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook was appointed 
to head a medical panel and make an impartial evaluation of the 
medical aspects of the case, including the effects of 
pre-existing conditions. Dr. Holbrook's report concluded, in 
pertinent part, (1) that Hodges was 100% physically impaired; 
and (2) that Hodges "total impairment excluding the generalized 
arthritis is 35% permanent loss of body function", 26% 
attributable to pre-existing conditions, and 9% attributable to 
the accident on February 23, 1981. (R.91.) (Emphasis added.) 
In testimony, Dr. Holbrook reiterated his evaluation that 
Hodges' permanent disability is "35 percent . excluding the 
generalized arthritis." (R.111.) On August 24, 1982, the 
Division of Rehabilitation Services submitted its report, 
concluding that in light of his age and substantial physical 
impairment: "Mr. Hodges is not a good candidate for 
rehabilitation." (R.99.) 
After receipt of these reports from Dr. Holbrook and 
the Division of Rehabilitation Services, the Ad~inistrative Law 
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~0r~t 1 C0nclusions of Law and Order 
• •m~nt of Hodges' bodily functions, 
r:: x ~ 111:::: i ·,; ·~ :J f :-i l -~ ;. r -_ ':! ,.- i t J ,= c ;·, n di ti on : 
His functional disability is unquestionably due 
to his gener3l12ed arthritis but there is no 
5oubt that the 2pplicant is also significantly 
affected by the 35% impairment attributable to 
the earlier injuries combined with this acci-
dent. This would most probably render him per-
manently and totally disabled when considered 
in conjunction with his age, education and 
experience. The Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation has clearly indicated that he is 
not a candidate for rehabilitation. [T]he 
applicant's impairment combined with employment 
problems incident to age, education and 
experience, are sufficient to render the 
applicant oermanentlv and totally disabled 
irrespective of any consideration of his 
generalized arthritis. (R.101-02.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Administrative Law Judge accordingly awarded Hodges 
permanent total disability benefits, the maximum provided under 
Utah's compensation laws. 
Within a few days of this finding, the Administrative 
Law Judge reversed his conclusion that Hodges was permanently 
and totally disabled and entered a Supplemental Order. He left 
intact Finding No. 4 that "[Hodges'] overall permanent physical 
impairment attributable to conditions exclusive of the 
generalized arthritis is 35%". The Administrative Law Judge 
then ruled that Hodg~s' permanent total disability was due to 
his generalized arthritis which beca~e symptomatic after the 
industrial inju:y and thus not compensable as a post-existing 
condition. 
The ~dministrative Law Judge's Supplemental Order 
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also recomputed Hodge~' wJ;es. I n f 1~ r r 1 q' i t r ~ :--1 r . , I 
only be~n wort\ ing lon9 enou~h ..-_ __j~-:h J·?J.C t 1) eJ.r n t ',,1, .iu.< i 1 ; n 
$5,500 allowed before his earning3 woulJ be off;~· egai~~t 
Social Security benefits, the Administrative Law Judge selected 
the figure of $106.00 ($5,500.00 divided by 52 ·..ieeks) as 
representing Hodge's weekly earnings. (R.138-39.) This · .... ·as in 
the face of uncontroverted testimony that at the time o~ his 
accident, Hodges was working a full 40-hour week and earning 
$655.20 per week (36 hours at $15.60 per hour; four hours at 
$23.40 per hour). (R.23-24.) 
After the applicant timely filed a motion to review, 
the Industrial Commission of Utah summarily affirmed the 
Administrative Law Judge's Supplemental Order en May 17, 1983. 
(R.152-53.) A petition for a writ of review was thereupon 
filed with this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. HODGES' BENEFITS MUST BE BASED ON THE 
AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE FORi'lULA PROVIDED BY 
LAW. 
The Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
when it disregarded statutory and factual wage calculations and 
substantially reduced Hodge's benefits because of his age or 
other assumptions not supported by the record. 
The Commission mistakenly asserts that Hodges could 
only earn up to $5,500.00 per year before suffering an offs~t 
against his Social Security benefits. This is simply not 
crue. Current Social Security law provides that after age 70, 
there is no offset against wages earned. 42 u.s.c. §403 (f\ (3); 
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1 I) (' :-· ~ T) ~ l ,J 1 , J, ~ :) ( _, ) ( _ Tiic1s, a man of Hodge's age (he was 
earn an uni irnited income 3nd still receive his full Social 
Sec~rity benefits. It is t:njust to deny Hodges workmen's 
compensation benefits based upon a false assumption about 
income limitations in the Social Security laws, especially in 
light of Hodges' pre-accident physical vigor and his abhorrence 
of being iole. 
At the time of his February 23, 1931, accident, 
Hodges was a full-time employee of Western Piling, working 40 
hours per week. Under these circurntances, Hodges' benefits are 
required by statute to be calculated upon the basis of his 
weekly earnings at the time of the accident. Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-75 (1), provides in pertinent part: 
(T]he average weekly wage of the injured 
employee at the time of injury shall be taken as 
the basis upon which to compute the weekly 
compensation rate and shall be determined as 
follows: 
* * * 
(e) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the hour, the average weekly wage shall 
be determined by multiplying the hourly rate by 
the number of hours the employee would have 
worked for the week if the accident had not 
intervened. 
"The statute clearly fixes the basis upon which benefits ace to 
be computed, 3nd when that b3sis is capable of being definitely 
ascert3ined, the benefits may not be enlarged or 
diminished because the injured employee may have had larger or 
smaller earnings prior to the time of his injury in some other 
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or the same employment." Mill.3rd Count' v. Trod i;ci:-i :1 
Commission, 62 Utah 45, 217 P. 97~, 976 (1923). 
s i g n i f i can t 1 y , th~~ s t 3. tu t e p r e s u in es th rl t cl '1 i ~ l j 1J ':" ~~ J 
employee's weekly wages would have continued ind 0 finitely but 
for the injury. Park Utah Consol. Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 84 Utah 481, 36 P.2d 979, 982 (1934). Because of 
this presumption, an injured worker who had previously been 
engaged in intermittent employment such as construction may 
receive more in benefits than he would have received in wages 
had he not been injured. Such a consequence is entirely 
proper. Morrison-Merrill & Co. v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 81 Utah 363, 18 P.2d 295, 298 (1933). Yet the redllced 
benefits awarded to Hodges ignore the statutory presumption for 
the 9recise reason rejected in Morrison-Merrill & Co., sup;:a, 
viz., because Hodges might have received more in benefits than 
he would have earned in wages. 
In a similar case, a Texas court held that the fact 
that a pulpwood hauler had intentionally limited his earnings 
to protect his Social Security benefits in the previous y2ar 
did not otherwise remove him from the clearly expressed 
statutory formula for determining benefits on a weekly wage 
basis. Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. McMahon, 509 
S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). The court stated: 
It is the wage-earning capacity which is 
protected by the compensation act. Even though 
the claiment in the case before us mav have 
been limiting his earnings at the t~ this 
cause of action arose, he should be free to 
change his mind. 
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35,500.00 ~er vear but f~r his injury is sheer speculation. 
Even aside from the fact that deductions from his Social 
Security benefits would have ceased at age 70, Hodges was free 
at any time to earn as much as possible beyond the base level 
of subsistance offered by Social Security. Hodges was an 
energetic worker who enjoyed work for its own sake. Nowhere, 
indeed, does the record show that Hodges limited his earnings 
to $5,500.00 per year even before his accident. It indictes 
only that he was aware of the consequences of earning more than 
this amount, and that he preferred working despite the 
consequences. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-75(1), supra, presumes that 
Hodges' weeKly wages earned at the time of his injury would 
continue indefinitely into the future. Park Utah Consol. Mines 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra, at 982. The Commission 
ought not be allowed to engage in speculation as to what a 
claimant rniqht do in a future year. Not only does such 
speculation disregard the statutory presumption, but it has 
resulted in predictions wholly at odds with the evidence. 
Hodges' benef:ts should have been computed, as was correctly 
done in the ;arninistrative Law Judge's original order, on the 
basis of nis av~rage w•ekly w3ge at the time of his injury. 
II. HODGEo IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
PERMANENT TOT.'\L DISABILITY BENEFITS 
BASED UPON THE FINDING OF 35% IMPAIRMENT, 
EXCLUSIVE OF HIS ARTHRITIC CONDITION. 
Tne ~edical panel clearly and unequivocally found 
-9-
that petitioner had a 35% per,canent physi,_.:i\ io,n:r ,,._. tc 
the industrial injury and pre-existing cond it i ,,n-, ::'_-~_I_:,'_':'.'._'' 
his arthritic condition. (R.136.) The Admini~t·at1v2 Law Jud3e 
found likewise, both in his original and supplemental ,rders. 
The test for determining total disability under the 
Utah Workmen's Compensation Law is well established: 
[A] workman may be found totally disabled if by 
reason of the disability resulting from his 
injury he cannot perform work of the general 
character he was performing when injured, or by 
other work which a man of his capabilities may 
be able to do or learn to do. 
United Park Mines Company v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 393 P.2d 
800, 801-02 (1964). In determining an injured employee's 
degree of disability, it is appropriate to consider factors 
extrinsic to an industrial injury such as "age, mental ability, 
prior training, and job market". Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 639 P.2d 138, 141 (Utah 1981). 
The Division of Rehabilitation Services found that in view of 
his age and physical impairment, there were no prospects for 
Hodges' rehabilitation. Thus, in his original order, the 
Administrative Law Judge found that Hodges' "35% impairment 
attributable to the earlier injuries combined with this 
accident . . would probably render him permanently and 
totally disabled when considered in conjunction with hi3 age, 
education and experience". (R.101-02.) 
The present case is almost identical to the 
situation before this Court in Brundage v. I~L Freight, Inc., 
622 P. 2d 790 (Utah 1981). In Brundage, the medical testimony 
-10-
-, C) ~ - j ;- ' I l ]~\ r~rmanent physical disability. 
sl3ir.1aril:. 1 s li'Tlitations, th:?r~ w~.:rG no occupations pr2sently 
available to him. This Court properly held that in view of 
such uncontradicted evidence, the Commission "could not have 
formed the bona fide opinion that plaintiff was not then 
incapable of re-entering the labor market by reason of his 
?hysical disabilities". Id. at 792, (quoting Buxton v. 
Industrial Commission, 587 P.2d 121, 123-24 (Utah 1978)). 
Similarly in this case, the uncontradicted evidence is that 
Hodges' 35% impairment is permanent and that there is no 
occupation presently available to him. Accordingly, the 
finding of 35% total impairment, when combined with Hodges' 
age, education and experience, entitles him to an award of 
permanent and total disability benefits. 
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ACTED 
ARBITRARILY BY FAILING TO CONSIDER 
CLAI~ANT'S ARTHRITIC CONDITION AS A 
PRE-EXISTING IMPAIRMENT. 
All of the medical evidence demonstrates the 
existence of a severe osteoarthritic condition becoming 
sympt~matic shortly after the industrial injury and concurrent 
with the initia: treatments. ~o amount of permanent partial 
disability wis assigned to this condition. The medical panel 
and the Admi~istra~~~e Law J~d~e simply found that this 
condition a~one was significant enough to render the claimant 
permanent~y totally disabled from employment. The medical 
panel f~~nd that this diff~se severe arthritic problem had its 
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onset subsequent to the accident of F.:_:.bruary ::.3, 1·~:~1, ~11_ "''1 
not related to those events. The pan.el ::lirl not f 1n 1 t:_ .-1l ti1· 
severe arthritic problems were totally cost-existing. In fact, 
they noted "previous multiple records in this patient indicate 
pre-existing arthritic changes in the right shoulder, back and 
left knee". (R.91.) 1 While the severe symptomatic condition 
may have occurred after the industrial injury of February 1981, 
it is clear that the arthritic condition itself pre-existed 
this industrial injury and had created significant enough 
modifications to have been previously noted. 
The Administrative Law Judge's initial determination 
that Hodges was permanently and totally disabled from gainful 
employment was made without reference to this arthritic 
condition. If the arthritic condition is considered, however, 
as a pre-existing condition, whether or not it was symptomatic, 
the Administrative Law Judge would presumably assign permanent 
total disability to this condition alone, as well as to this 
condition when considered together with all previous injuries. 
The fact that the Administrative Law Judge simply 
changed his mind was in and of itself an arbitrary and 
capricious act in that it deprived claimant of an opportunity 
1 see also, (1) R.84: November 30, 1957 x-rays showing "fairly 
extensive hypertrophic arthritis in the lower dorsal and lumbar 
spine"; (2) R.85: July 25, 1965 note showing "suggestion of 
definite acromio-clavicular arthritis"; (3) R.35: 1956 report 
from Dr. Howard re associated traumatic arthritis and "marginal 
osteophytic spurring", and 1973 report showing traumatic 
arthritis of the left knee; (4) R.86: 1974 report showing "two 
arthritic shoulders and one arthritic knee may render further 
employment unlikely". 
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il): 1 l' \ ~ i 
'-==- r;.·-1r 
in i~ r<0questing clarification of 
l-1 i' ,- r'·" cla irnant believed that his 
3~~ ::1i.;abilit'/ '•''-:iJ1'J r~o'":. i'."l L:r:d nf itself ha'1e been deemed to 
render claixant totall; disabl~d, the claimant would have 
objected to the medical panel report and thus sought 
clarification of the panel's feeling that had claimant not had 
an arthritic condition, he probably would have stabilized on or 
about June 23, 1981, and ~ay or may not have then been totally 
and permanently disabled. All of the panel's statements, as 
well as the Administrative Law Judge's findings, are based upon 
speculation as to what could or could not have occurred had he 
not had osteoarthritis. The fact remains that the claimant was 
hospitalized on tne date he was supposedly stablized from his 
industrial injury and was totally incapacitated from any work 
whatsoever. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial 
Commission committed the following errors of law in this matter: 
1. Failing to find that Theodore Hodges is 
permanently and totally disabled, despite uncontroverted 
evidence that he is at least 35% impaired due to the industrial 
accident and pre-e~isting conditions (exclusive of arthritic 
conditions); 
2. Fa1l1ng to c>nsider the pre-existing arthritic 
condition in a determination of his total disability benefits; 
3. Failing to calculate Hodges' benefits based upon 
his actual avera~e ~eekly wage at the time of his industrial 
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accident; 
4. Failing to applf the stacutor1 pc·s1m}~inn l~ 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-75 that Hodges' average w 0 ~kly wage at the 
time of his industrial accident would have continued 
indefinitely but for the accident; and 
5. Engaging in speculation, unsubstantiated by law 
or by the evidence in this case, concerning the amount of work 
Hodges would have chosen to perform had he not been injured. 
Accordingly, the Commission's order denying benefits 
should be reversed and remanded for the purpose of awarding 
benefits for permanent total disability to Theodore Hodges, and 
to properly calculate benefits in the manner contained in the 
Administration Law Judge's original order. 
1984. 
0698L 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ::;-tf-day of February, 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 533-8383 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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A true and c0rrect copy of PETITIONER'S BRIEF was 
plac0d in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following persons on this !fl!- day of February, 1984: 
James A. Black 
Suite 500 
Ten West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Frank V. Nelson 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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Gilbert Martinez 
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